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I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act' ("ADA" or "Act") is a federal civil
rights statute that was enacted in 1990 "to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities."2 In the employment arena, the ADA prohibits a "covered entity"3
from "discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because
of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 4 Thus,
one of the primary purposes of the ADA is to remove barriers that prevent
qualified individuals from enjoying the same employment opportunities that
are available to persons without disabilities.'
To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove: 1)
that he has a disability; (2) that he is a qualified individual; and, (3) that he
B.A. 1991, M.P.A. 1994, Florida International University; J.D. 1999, University of Miami
*
School of Law. Special thanks to Professor Terence I.Anderson for his continued patience and support and
to Professor Susan Stefan for her guidance in Disability Law.
1
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
2
42 U.S.C § 12101(b)(IX1990). See also Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667,671
(1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
3
A "covered entity" is defined as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
fifteen (15) or more employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(aX1990).
4
Id.
5
See Burch v. Coca-Cola, Co., 119 F.3d 305, 313 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Taylor v. Principal
Fin. Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 161 (5th Cir. 1996)).
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was discriminated against because of his disability.6 The ADA defines
"disability" as (a) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activities of such individual; (b) a record of such
impairment; or, (c) being regarded as having such an impairment.7 In
evaluating an "impairment," the courts may consider: 1) the individual's
condition without regard to mitigating measures;' or, 2) the same individual's
condition after the mitigating measures are in place.9
When Congress passed the ADA, it authorized the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")to issue regulations that define workplace
discrimination under Title I of the ADA.' 0 The EEOC guidelines" support the
position that mitigating measures should not be considered when evaluating

6

See 42 U.S.C. § 12132(1990). See also Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516,519

(1lth Cir. 1997). But c. Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 58 (4th Cir.
1995) (holding that "[i]n
a typical discharge case brought under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) she was inthe protected class; (2) she was discharged; (3) at the time
of the discharge, she was performing her job at a level that met her employees legitimate expectations; and,
(4) her discharge occurred under circumstances that raise a reasonable inference of unlawful
discrimination."). The Ennis court applied this formulation of the final prong for two reasons: "[flirst,
[w]here disability... is at issue, the plaintiff in many, if not most, cases will be unable to determine
whether a replacement employee is... disabled ....Second, even if the plaintiff could obtain such
information, requiring a showing that the replacement was outside the protected class would lead to the
dismissal of many legitimate disability discrimination claims, since most replacements would fall within
the broad scope of the ADA's protected class." d. "Therefore, it is necessary to reformulate the fourth
prong ... to require that the plaintiff present some other affirmative evidence that disability was a
determining factor in the employer's decision. Id at 59. See also Homes v. Bevilacqua, 794 F.2d 142 (4th
Cir. 1996) (en banc).
Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals seems to be the only circuit court relying on this fourth
prong, as the majority of the federal appellate courts that have addressed the issue of a prima facie case
under the ADA rely on the three-prong test.
42 U.S.C § 12102(2)(1990).
8
For example, an individual with 20/200 vision without his corrective lenses.
9
For example, the same individual wearing corrective lenses.
10
See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1990). Nevertheless, this authority has come under attack by the federal
courts as they battle to interpret the ADA. See generallyEnnis, 53 F.3d at 55:
The EEOC, under its charge to issue regulations to carry out Title 1 of the ADA, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 12116, has defined "physical or mental impairment" to include "[a]ny physiological disorder,
or condition.... affecting one or more of the following systems: reproductive... hemic and
lymphatic." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). Although uncertain of the EEOC's authority to
promulgate this regulation, since it interprets a term which does not appear in Title I (the
specified extent of the EEOC's regulatory authority), we do not understand this regulation to
be in conflict with the above conclusion. This regulation does not eliminate (nor could it) the
statutory requirement that the physical or mental impairment substantially limit a major life
activity of the particularindividual.
Id. at 59-60, n.4.
11
29 C.F.R app. § 1630.2(h) (1996).
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an impairment. The majority of the circuits rely on the EEOC guidelines,
reasoning that if an impairment is considered with regard to mitigating
measures, then the "substantially limit[ing]" requirement would be eliminated
from the statute. 2 Nevertheless, one circuit maintains the minority view,
which takes mitigating measures into consideration. The split between the
circuits highlights the fundamental question of how much deference is due to
interpretations proffered by administrative agencies.
This Article focuses on the proper interpretation of "disability,"' 3 as
defined by the ADA, with a particular focus on the first prong of the
definition.' 4 Accordingly, the crux of the issue is whether courts should
consider mitigating measures when determining if an impairment substantially
limits a major life activity of an individual. Underlying that issue is whether
the courts should defer to the EEOC's mandate, given that the doctrine of
judicial deference to administrative agencies is deceivingly simple and
inconsistently applied. Part II of this Article reviews the circuit court
decisions that implement the EEOC guidelines 5 evaluating the impairment
without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as medication
or treatment. Part M focuses on the minority viewpoint, adhered to only by the
Tenth Circuit, which considers the individual's situation once the impairment
is controlled by medication or treatment. Part IV briefly analyzes the Chevron
doctrine,' 6 which sets forth the standard of review afforded to agency
decisions and interpretations. Part V demonstrates the inconsistency with
which the Supreme Court has applied the Chevron. In Part VI, the Chevron
doctrine is applied to the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance and discusses the
various reasons why judicial deference to the EEOC guidelines is inappropriate are discussed. Part VII concludes that the Supreme Court is likely to apply
the EEOC guidelines, despite persuasive textual arguments favoring rejection
of that interpretation.

See Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
In Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 2202 (1998). a heavily-fragmented Supreme Court
recently applied a three-step test to determine whether the plaintiff was disabled under the ADA. First, it
12
13

considered whether the HIV infection in that case was an impairment. Ud Second, the Court identified the
life activity which the plaintiff claimed was limited, in that case reproduction and child bearing, to
determine whether it constituted a major life activity under the ADA. Id. Third, it "tied the two statutory
phrases together" and determined whether the impairment substantially limited the major life activity, Id.
See also infra notes 202-04.
14
That prong defines "disability' as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one

or more of the major life activities of such individual. 42 U.S.C § 12102(2)(1990).
Is
16

See 29 C.F.R app. § 1630.2(h) (1996).
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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PERSPECTIVES SUPPORTING THE EEOC GUIDELINES

When Congress enacted the ADA, its purpose was to provide "clear,
strong, consistent, enforceable standards."' 7 Yet because many of the ADA's
terms are ambiguous, the courts are left to interpret, with little and conflicting
legislative history to assist them, the meaning and proper application of the
ADA."8 This has resulted in inconsistent rulings by the courts, as they strive
to determine the reach of the ADA's protection.
The majority of the circuits support the EEOC's interpretation of the
ADA, 9 which suggests that the courts evaluate an impairment without regard
to the availability of mitigating measures? Several persuasive arguments are
set forth by the circuits which defer to the EEOC guidelines. First, they argue,
the EEOC guidelines are consistent with the text of the ADA. 2' In particular,
the Act defines disability to include "with respect to an individual .... a
physical ... impairment that substantially limits 22 one or more of the major
1

42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b)(2)(1990).

is

See Harvard Law Review Association, The Anericans with DisabilitiesAct: Great Progress,
GreaterPotential,109 HARV. L REv. 1602, 1615 (1996).
9
See Washington v. HCA Health Sery. of Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 464 (5th Cit. 1998) (adopting the

EEOC's interpretation, but narrowing it to apply to only specific disabilities); Arnold v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854 (1st Cir. 1998) (adopting the EEOC guidelines as the proper interpretation);
Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933 (3d Cit. 1997) (same); Gilday v. Mecosta
County, 124 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 1997) (same); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624,627 (8th Cir. 1997)
(same); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516,520-21 (11 th Cit. 1996) (same); Holihan v. Lucky
Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996) (same), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1349 (1997); Roth v.
Lutheran General Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir. 1995) (same). See a/so Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965

F. Supp. 87 (D.D.C. 1997); Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dept., 964 F.Supp. 898, 907 (E.D. Pa.
1997); Hendler v. Intelecom USA, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 200, 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Shiflett v. GE Fanuc
Automation Corp., 960 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (W.D. Va. 1997); Sicard v. Sioux City, 950 F. Supp. 1420,
1438-39 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Sarsycki v. United Parcel Sery., Inc., 862 F. Supp. 336, 340 (W.D. Okla. 1994).
20
See 29 C.F.R app. § 1630.2(h) (1996). Similarly, the United States Department of Justice,
which is charged with enforcing the ADA's prohibition of discrimination based on disability on the part
of state and local entities, also assesses disabilities without regard to the availability of mitigating measures.
See 28 C.F.R. app. § 35.104 (1996).
21
22

See Harris, 102 F.3d at 521.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(jXI)(ii) (1996): "[Ihe term substantiallylimits means: ... significantly

restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major
life activity as compared to the condition, manner or duration under which the average person in the general
population can perform that same major life activity." However, that the EEOC did not address in this
regulation whether an impairment that, "substantially limits one or more of [an individual's] major life
achievement" should be considered with or without mitigating measures. This is significant because if they
had, that clarification would be in a regulation which is afforded substantial deference. See discussion infra
at p. 26 and accompanying notes 196-201. However, because the EEOC chose only to include it in the
appendix to those regulations, it is not entitled to a great degree of deference. See id.
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life activities of such individual."23 Thus, if a person is unable to perform a
major life activity without depending on medication or a medical device to
ameliorate the effects of that impairment, that person suffers from a
disability.24 For example, a person who requires a hearing aid may be
considered limited in the major life activity of hearing.25
Second, these courts reason that because many disabilities can be
overcome through technology or other assistance, employers are expected to
make reasonable accommodations, an underlying purpose of the ADA.26 In
other words, an employer can easily accommodate a person whose condition
is completely controlled.2 7 Thus, although a person may be able to overcome
the effects of their impairment through mitigating measures, and as a result
require very little, if any, accommodation, this "achievement should not leave
him subject to discrimination based on his underlying disability."2 The final
argument presented by these courts is that the ADA's legislative history
strongly supports the position of the EEOC.29
In Baert v. Euclid Beverage Limited,3 a recent decision by the Seventh
Circuit, the court cited its earlier decision in Roth v. Lutheran General

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a) (1990).
See, e.g., Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 763 (6th Cir. 1997).
2
Id.at n.3.
[S]imilarly, a person with only one foot is disabled under the ADA even if a prosthesis allows
him to function just as well as most two-footed people. This is a core case of disability.... To
say that such a person does not suffer a limitation and is therefore not disabled would strain the
meaning of both terms .... The EEOC's 'no mitigating measures' interpretation embodies the
sensible position that the use of a prosthetic aid or medication does not eliminate the underlying
disability although it may, as a practical matter, reduce or even eliminate its effects.
Id. (quoting Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87, 93 (D.D.C. 1997).
26
See Gilday, 124 F.3d at 763.
Id. Yet this scenario begs the question of whether or not this individual truly requires an
accommodation by the employer. If the disability is overcome, for example, a person with 20/40 vision
wears eyeglasses to correct her vision to 20/20, is there really anything left for an employer to
accommodate? See Fallacaro, 965 F. Supp. at 93 ("That a person with a disability is able to use medical
knowledge or technology to overcome the effects of his condition .,. may mean that he will, in practice,
rarely require any sort of accommodation..
28
See Gilday, 124 F.3d at 763.
29
See Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760,764 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing the House Education
and Labor Committee Report, H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1), at 53 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 334). But see Runnebaurn v. Nationsbank of Maryland, N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 168 (4th Cir. 1997)
(refusing to consider Amici arguments citing to Committee Reports because the court found the statutory
meaning of "impairment" was plain and unambiguous, and therefore had no need to resort to legislative
history to determine the intent of Congress. See also discussion infra at pp. 21, 22 and accompanying notes
179-88.
30
149 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 1998).
23
2
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Hospital3 for the proposition that the evaluation of an individual's impairment should be made without regard to mitigating measures or assistive
devices.32 In Roth, the court found that a doctor with strabismus" was not
entitled to a preliminary injunction against his potential employer because he
failed to show he was "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA. The doctor
claimed he discriminatorily was declined residency at Lutheran General
Hospital because of his sight disability. 3' The Roth court considered the fact
that, before applying for his residency in pediatrics at Lutheran, the doctor had
been a registered pharmacist and had successfully attended law school while
working as a pharmacist." In addition to functioning, in his own words, "very
well" as a registered pharmacist and as an attorney, he was also a faculty
lecturer at the University of Illinois.36 The court concluded that "not every
impairment that affects an individual's major life activities is a substantially
limiting impairment."" Nevertheless, although the court in Roth quoted the
EEOC interpretation, the court did not apply it. Therefore, because the court
in Baert relied on Roth in applying the EEOC's interpretation without any
substantial analysis, the Seventh Circuit's
current rationale for relying on the
38
EEOC guidelines remains unclear.
In Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc.,3 the Ninth Circuit also relied on the
EEOC's interpretation, finding insufficient evidence to support the plaintiff's
claims that outside work following his discharge from the hospital constituted
a mitigating measure.' In that case, the plaintiff was diagnosed with "Organic
31
57 F.3d 1446 (7th Cir. 1995). But see Etavac v. Holy Family Health Plus, 13 F. Supp.2d 737,
745 n.3 (N.D. 11. 1998) (stating it is "impossible to tell from Roth whether the Seventh Circuit would
endorse the guidelines as a permissible interpretation of the ADA," and instead applying the First Circuit's
analysis and conclusions in Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 866 (1st Cir. 1998)).
32
See Baert, 149 F.3d at 629. See also Granzow v. Eagle Food Centers, Inc., 27 F. Supp.2d 1105

(N.D. I. 1998) (relying on Baert); Denson v. Village of Bridgeview, 19 F. Supp. 2d 829 (N.D. I1.1998)

(same).
33
See Roth, 57 F.3d at 1448, 1446 n.l (7th Cir. 1995) ("Strabismus is a condition in which the
eyes are not correctly aligned. For example, one may be looking straight ahead while the other eye is not
looking in the same direction.").
34
Id. at 1452.
33
Id. at 1455.
36
Id. at 1448.
37
Id. at 1454 (quoting Hamm v. Runyon, 51 F.3d 721, 724 (7th Cir. 1995).

Roth court noted that the mere use of mitigating measures does not automatically prove the
presence of a disability. Roth, 57 F.3d at 1454 (quoting Hamm v. Runyon, 51 F.3d 721, 726 (7th Cir.
1995) ("... not every impairment that affect[s] an individual's major life activities is a substantially
limiting impairment."). See also Fornisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931,934 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting the key is the
extent to which the impairment restricts a major fife activity and concluding the impairment must be a
significant one.).
3'The

39

87 F.3d 362 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.denied, 117 S. Ct. 1349 (1997).

40

Id. at 366.
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Mental Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified"'" and was granted continuing
leaves of absence totaling six months, as allowed under his employer's leave
of absence policy.42 Nevertheless, during the last two months of his approved
leave, the plaintiff worked up to eighty hours per week preparing to open a
sign-making business, obtaining his real estate license, and selling real
estate.43 The employer refused to extend his leave of absence4 beyond the six
months and terminated him when he did not return to work.
When the plaintiff reapplied four months later, his former employer
offered him a clerical position instead of his previous management position,
because there were no management positions open at the time.45 The
employee refused the offer and filed suit, alleging discrimination on the basis
of his disability.46 He argued that his pursuits in the sign-making and real
estate businesses should be considered "mitigating measures, akin to
treatment, which enabled him to overcome his impairment. ' '47 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff was not actually
disabled within the meaning of the ADA because his impairment, when
considered without regard to mitigating measures, did not substantially limit
him in any major life activity.4 8
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Harrisv. H & W Contracting
49
Co. has also deferred to the EEOC interpretation. In Harris, the court
reasoned that although the guidelines' provided by the EEOC in the appendix
to the federal regulations are not law,5 the Supreme Court has held that an
agency's interpretation should be given "considerable weight."52

41
42

Id. at 364.
Id. at 364-65.

43

Id. at 364.
Id. at 365.

4
43
46
47

Id.
Id.
Id.

"
Id. However, the court went on to state that "[e]ven if Holihan were not actually disabled, the
ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals 'regarded as' disabled. If Lucky regarded Holihan as
disabled, Holihan would have a 'disability' within the meaning of section 12102(2)(c)." Id. at 366. The
court found a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether Lucky regarded Holihan as disabled
within the meaning of section 12102(2) of the ADA, and summary judgment was, therefore, improperly
granted to Lucky. Id. at 366-67. See also Coleman v. Southern Pacific Trans. Co., 997 F. Supp. 1197,
1201 (D.Az. 1998) (relying on Holihan to conclude that courts are not to consider mitigating measures in
determining whether an individual is disabled).
,9 102 F.3d 516 (11 th Cir. 1996).
so See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1996).

st

See Harris, 102 F.3d at 521.

52

Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843

(1984).
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In Harris,the plaintiff suffered from active Graves' disease, an endocrine
order affecting the thyroid gland, and brought an action under the ADA
against her former employer after her employer replaced her while she was out
on sick leave.53 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court's
finding of summary judgment for the employer. The court remanded the case
for consideration of whether the employee's impairment, in the absence of
mitigating measures, would substantially limit her major life activities. 5' The
Eleventh Circuit found the EEOC's view was supported by legislative history
and was a reasonable interpretation of the statute.55
In Doane v. City of Omaha,s the Eighth Circuit also relied on the EEOC's
interpretation when a police officer brought a claim under the ADA." The
police officer claimed that the city's refusal to rehire him after a short medical
leave because of his blindness in one eye was discriminatory." Relying on the
59 the court refused to consider
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Harris,
mitigating measures, which included the way in which the police officer
compensated for his limitation by subconsciously using his stronger eye to
redevelop his depth perception.'
In Gilday v. Mecosta County,6" the Sixth Circuit also concluded that the
EEOC interpretation was correct. The court set aside the trial court's
determination that the employee's diabetes, when properly treated and
controlled, fell outside the protection of the ADA. 62 The employee, a
paramedic, was a diabetic who took oral medication, monitored his blood
levels, and kept a strict regimen of diet and exercise.63 The employer claimed
that the employee was fired because of the employee's history of rudeness and

s3

See Harris, 102 F.3d at 518.
Id. at 524.
5s
See also Bancale v. Cox Lumber Co., Inc., No. 97-113-CIV-FTM-25D, 1998 WL 469863, at
*I (M.D. Fi. May 18, 1998) (same, relying on Harris). However, the Harris court recognized that some
individuals may use mitigating "measures to alleviate impairments that are not substantially limiting" and
54

that as a result, the mere use of a mitigating measure does not automatically prove the presence of a
disability. Id. at 521. See also Roth v. Lutheran General Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir. 1995)
(finding not every impairment that affects an individual's major life activities is a substantially limiting
impairment).
36
57

59
59
6

115 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 627.
Id. at 626.
See discussion infra pp. 315-16 and accompanying notes 49-55.
See Doane, l15 F.3d at 627. Another mitigating measure was the fact that the police officer had

learned to compensate for his loss of peripheral vision by adjusting his head position. Id.
61
Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997).
62
Id. at 765.
63
Id.
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conduct unbecoming a paramedic." The employee, on the other hand, argued
that stress caused his blood sugar to fluctuate, thereby resulting in his
frustration and irritability." Furthermore, he claimed the employer should
have honored his request for a transfer "to a less chaotic station, which would
have allowed him to maintain the regimen that control[led] his diabetes.""
The Sixth Circuit relied on the EEOC guidelines67 in finding that the trial
court should have examined the impairment without regard to the availability
of mitigating measures.
The Third Circuit in Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co.,"8
has also addressed the mitigating measures issue. In that case, the court found
that an employee who had been diagnosed with epilepsy thirty years prior to
suffering a seizure at work had to be evaluated in his unmedicated state.6 9
After suffering an epileptic seizure while working, the employee was
hospitalized for almost three weeks, put on a new medication for approximately six months, and had his physical activities curtailed."0 When he
returned to work, his employer placed him on restricted duty and assigned him
work that was not prohibited by his doctor.7 Approximately four months
later, the employer terminated him, citing the employee's inadequate job
performance and the company's unavailability of work.72 The employee
claimed these reasons were pretextual and that the real reason he was
terminated was because of his epilepsy." In reversing the decision, the Third
Circuit relied on the EEOC's guidelines7 4 and the legislative history of the
ADA, and concluded that the congressional intent of the ADA was to consider
the individual in his untreated condition."
Finally, the First Circuit in Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 6
deferred to the EEOC guidelines and to the circuit court decisions that have
expressly adopted the guidelines. In Arnold, the defendant, United Parcel
Service, refused to hire a driver to operate a commercial motor vehicle

64
65
66

67
69
9
70
71
72

73

Id.
Id.
Id.
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (1996).
136 F.3d 933 (3rd Cir. 1997).
Id at 937.
Id. at 935.
Id.
Id.

Id.

See also Deane v. Pocono Med. Center, No. 96-7174, 1997 WL 500144, at *1 (3rd Cir. Aug.
25, 1997) (relying on the EEOC's definition of when an individual is "regarded as" being disabled).
7
See Matczak, 136 F.3d at 937-38.
76
136 F.3d 854 (lst Cir. 1998).
74
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because of his insulin-dependent diabetes.77 At a pre-employment physical,
the driver was told that the "Department of Transportation regulations
preclude[d] insulin-dependent diabetics from obtaining the DOT certification"
he needed for the job.7" The First Circuit reversed, concluding that the district
court erred in evaluating the plaintiff's condition in light of the ameliorating
effects of his medication.79 The First Circuit declined to fully defer to the
EEOC interpretative guidelines, ° but noted they were consistent with the
ADA's legislative history."
I1.

PERSPECTIVES REJECTING THE EEOC

GUIDELINES

Clearly, the majority of the circuit courts support the EEOC's interpretation of the ADA, which suggests that the courts should evaluate the impairment without regard to the availability of mitigating measures. The opposing
viewpoint, specifically adhered to by only one circuit court, is that the
impairment should be evaluated by the court once the impairment is controlled
by medication or treatment.8 2
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, 3 the Tenth Circuit reasoned that courts
should be "concerned with whether the impairment affects the individual in
fact, not whether it would hypothetically affect the individual without the use

Id. at 857.
Id.
79
However, the court failed to address the defendant's argument that the decision to deny the
plaintiff employment was because of DOT regulations, which incidentally, are consistent with the EEOC
guidelines with reference to mitigating measures.
go See discussion infra at pp. 334-35 accompanying notes 196-201, discussing the differing levels
of deference due to agency dictates, depending on whether they are legislative or interpretive.
N
See Arnol4 136 F.3d at 866. See also Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26, 30-31 (1st Cir.
1996) (relying on the EEOC's interpretation of the terms "disability," "physical impairment." "major life
activities," "substantially limited," and "factors to be considered in assessing whether an individual is
substantially limited in a major life activity"). In Katz, the First Circuit had previously relied on the
EEOC's interpretation of the ADA for other terms. Itcan be inferred that this court would likewise rely on
the EEOC's interpretation for "impairment."
92
See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
EEOC's Interpretive Guidance with regard to mitigating measures is in direct conflict with the plain
language of the ADA); Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (W.D. Wis. 1996) ("If
an insulin-dependent diabetic can control her condition with the use of insulin ... she cannot argue that
her life is substantially limited by her condition."); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872,
881 (D. Kan. 1996) (rejecting EEOC view as contrary to statute); Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp.
808, 813-14 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (same).
93
130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997), affirmed, Sutton v. United Air Lines, 119 S.Ct. 790 (1999).
Since this article was written, the United States Supreme Court has adopted this position. See also
discussion infra at pp. 328-36 (setting forth why such a conclusion is inevitable).
"
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of corrective measures."" In Sutton, twin sisters sought employment as
commercial airline pilots with United Air Lines ("United") but were
disqualified because their uncorrected vision failed to meet United's
requirements.8" United required pilot applicants to have uncorrected vision of
20/100 or better in each eye.86 The plaintiffs' vision was 20/200 in the right
eye and 20/400 in the left.87 However, plaintiffs' corrected vision was 20/20
in both eyes.88 The Tenth Circuit found for United, rejecting the EEOC
Interpretive Guidance suggestion that disability inquiries be made without
regard to mitigating measures.8 9 The court noted the plaintiffs' admissions
that with their corrective measures they "function[ed] identically to individuals without a similar impairment" and that their normal daily activities were
not limited to those that could be performed with their uncorrected vision."
The court concluded that:
Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways. They are either disabled
because their uncorrected vision substantially restricts their major live
[sic] activity of seeing and, thus, they are not qualified individuals for,
a pilot position with United, or they are qualified for the position
because their vision is correctable and does not substantially limit
their major life activity of seeing."
Several persuasive arguments support this position.' First, "the EEOC's
position on mitigating measures appears not in the regulations themselves,"
but rather in an appendix thereof.9 3 "The appendix constitutes a set of

4

Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902. But see Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 942 (10th Cir. 1994)

(relying on the EEOC interpretive guidelines for the correct definition of "major life activities": "The ADA
regulations adopt the definition of 'major life activities' found in the Rehabilitation Act regulations. 34
C.F.R. § 104. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, Appendix to Part 1630 - Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, § 1630.2() Major Life Activities."); MacDonald v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
94 F.3d 1437, 1444 (10th Cir. 1996) (relying on the EEOC for interpretation of "regarded as." "major life
activities" and "substantially limits": "The ADA does not define these terms. For this reason, we have
previously referred to the Act's implementing regulations, see 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, for clarification.").
85
Sutton, 130 F.3d at 895.

Id.
U
89
90
91
92

Id.
Id.
ld. at 901-02.

Id. at 903.
Id. (citation omitted).
These arguments are set forth most eloquently by Justice Kennedy in her dissent in Gilday v.

Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 766 (6th Cir. 1997).
93
Id. See also Coghlan v. HJ. Heinz Co., 851 F.Supp. 808, 811-12 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (rejecting
EEOC view as contrary to statute).
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interpretive, rather than legislative, rules and is therefore not binding law."94
Second, although such "administrative interpretation" may be properly
resorted to for guidance, 9 and interpretive rules are "entitled to some
' 96
deference where the rule is a permissible construction of the statute,
supporters of this viewpoint reject the EEOC's interpretation as being in
"conflict with the text of the statute, 97 and therefore not a permissible
construction of the statute."98 The reasoning behind this proposition is that the
EEOC's rule conflicts with the first requirement to prove a disability under the
ADA-a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity. 99 If one accepts the EEOC guidelines, then the individual is seen as
disabled even if, with the benefit of medication, the individual is not in fact
substantially limited in any major life activity." Further, even though the
legislative history lends some support to the EEOC position,' ' "where the
statutory text is unambiguous, there is no need to resort to legislative history
to cloud the text.' ' 1°2
The third argument rests on the notion that Congress did not intend "the
ADA to protect as disabled [all] individuals whose life activities would
hypothetically be substantially limited [if they were] to stop taking medication."' 3 Specifically, "where an impairment is fully controlled by mitigating
measures and such measures do not themselves substantially limit an
individual's major life activities," the individual should not be afforded
protection under the ADA." In essence, the reasoning follows, the EEOC is
creating a different standard for those persons who take medication for their
condition.' 0 This reasoning conflicts with the intent of the ADA, which is to

Gilday, 124 F.3d at 766 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (quoting Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50,55 (1995)).
97
U (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts, 492 U.S.
158, 171 (1989) ("[O]f course, no deference is due to agency interpretations at odds with the plain language
of the statute itself").
n
Gilday, 124 F.3d at 760 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

100

Id.

Id.
101
Id.
102
Id. (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994)).
103
ld at 767 (Guy, J., dissenting) (finding the impact of mitigating measures must be made on a
case by case basis depending on how functional the individuals are after taking their medication). See also
Erica Worth Harris, Controlled Impairments Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A Search for the
Meaning of "Disability," 73 WASH. L REV. 575, 580 (1998) (noting that according to the EEOC,
individuals with controlled impairments "have disabilities even if they do not experience, and have never
experienced, any limitation from their condition.").
104

Gilday, 124 F.3d at 767 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)

'
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provide
protection only for those whose impairments substantially limit their
lives. l°6
The Fifth Circuit has also, until recently, flatly rejected the EEOC
guidelines defining disability. In Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc.,'0 7 the
plaintiff argued that the court should adhere to the EEOC guidelines addressing mitigating measures.' Noting that it would not consider this argument
on appeal because the plaintiff had failed to present it in the district court, t°9
the Fifth Circuit nonetheless went on to state, in dicta, its position on the
EEOC guidelines." 0 The court noted that "the appendix is not part of the
regulations but is, instead, the EEOC's interpretation of those regulations."'I
Additionally, the court found that the section addressing mitigating measures
addresses impairment, not disability,"' and that "[a] physical impairment,
standing alone, is not necessarily a disability as contemplated by the ADA
[because t]he statute requires an impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities.""' The court went on to add that if Congress
had intended that "substantial limitation be determined without regard to mitigating measures, it would have provided for coverage under § 12102(2)(A) for
106

Id. In response to this argument, the Gilday majority rejoined: "It is hard to imagine that

Congress wished to provide protection to workers who leave it to their employers to accommodate their
impairments but to deny protection to those workers who act independently to overcome their disabilities
and thus create a disincentive to self-help." Id. at 763, n.5. Cf. Harris V.H. & W. Contracting, Co., 102
F.3d 516 (11 th Cir. 1996):
[RIational people will not cease to mitigate their impairments because the cost of living with
an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, even combined with the added
benefit of more generous ADA protection, is far greater than the cost of undertaking such
measures. Rational individuals would pay a hundred dollars per month for medication that
would enable them to live free of severe pain rather than sit at home in pain to save a thousand
dollars per month and receive the benefit of ADA protection.
Id. at 600-02. Further, several circuit courts have held that employees who refuse to take reasonable
mitigating measures to manage controllable impairments may not be able to demand that their employers
provide accommodations. See Van Styn v. Fancy Colours & Co., 125 F.3d 563, 570 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting
that "[a] plaintiff cannot recover under the ADA if through his own fault he fails to control an otherwise
controllable illness."); Keoughan v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 113 F.3d 1246, 1247 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting,
without comment, the lower court's reasoning that "[a] disabled individual is not 'qualified' if she needs
accommodation precisely because she failed to manage an otherwise controllable disorder"); Siefken v.
Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding employees do not have a cause of
action under the ADA if they are discharged due to their own failure to manage controllable disabilities).
107
85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996). See also Burch v. Coca-Cola, 119 F.3d 305, 316 (5th Cir. 1997);
Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 697 (5th Cir. 1995).
10
Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 191 (5th Cir. 1996).
109
Id.
110
Id. at 191 n.3.
M1
112

113

Id.
Id.

Id. (citing Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 726 (5th Cir. 1995)).
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impairments that have the potential to substantially limit a major life
activity.,,1 14
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit in Washington v. HCA Health Services of
Texas, Inc."' has recently modified its position. In Washington, the court
noted that although it was "more reasonable to say that mitigating measures
must be taken into account," that position was not "so much more reasonable
to warrant overruling the EEOC.' 6 The court concluded that it would follow
the EEOC guidelines and legislative history, but would read them narrowly:
"[o]nly serious impairments and ailments that are analogous to those
mentioned in the EEOC Guidelines and the legislative history - diabetes,
epilepsy and hearing impairments-[will] be considered in their unmitigated
state."" 17
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals is apparently undecided as to
whether to support or reject the EEOC's Interpretative Guidelines. For
example, in Ennis v. NationalAssociationof Business and EducationalRadio,
Inc.,"' the court stated its uncertainty of the EEOC's authority to interpret the
term 'impairment' "[s]ince it interprets a term that does not appear in Title I
(the specified extent of the EEOC's regulatory authority)... ." " Three years
later, however, the court seemed to rely on the EEOC guidelines. Although
it never reached the issue precisely, in Williams v. Channel MasterSatellite
Systems, Inc., Io the court cited Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson' for
the proposition that the EEOC guidelines "[w]hile not controlling upon the
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and

Ellison, 85 F.3d at 191-92 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996).
152 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1998).
116
See Washington, 152 F.3d at 470 (5th Cir. 1998). See also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1051 n.13 (5th Cir. 1998) (relying on the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance
in dicta, without analysis or discussion, six months before Washington was decided).
"17
Washington, 152 F.3d at 470. The Fifth Circuit went to on to state:
The impairments must be serious in common parlance, and they must require that the individual
use mitigating measures on a fiequent basis, that is, he must put on his prosthesis every morning
or take his medication with some continuing regularity. In order for us to ignore the mitigating
measures, they must be continuous and recurring; if the mitigating measures amount to
permanent corrections or ameliorations, then they may be taken into consideration. If an
individual has a permanent correction or amelioration, such as an artificial joint or a pin or a
transplanted organ, that individual must be evaluated in his mitigated state and cannot claim
that he is disabled because be would be "substantially limited in a major life activity" if he had
not had his hip joint replaced.
Id. at 470-71.
lit
53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995).
119
See Ennis, 53 F.3d at 59-60 n.4.
120
101 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 1996).
121
477 U.S. 57 (1986) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
14

[is
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informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance... ,""'
Yet, just one year later, in Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Maryland,
N.A., 3 the Fourth Circuit changed course once more. In Runnebaum, the
court implicitly rejected the EEOC guidelines, finding that the statutory
language of the ADA insofar as the meaning of the word "impairment" was
clear and unambiguous. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the word "[c]annot
be divorced from its dictionary and common sense connotation of a diminu'
tion in quality, value, excellence or strength."124
Consequently, the Fourth
Circuit interpreted the ADA without resorting to the EEOC guidelines,
reasoning that because the language was plain and unambiguous, there was no
need to resort to legislative history."n The court concluded that Congress did
not intend the ADA to cover conditions where no diminishing effects are
exhibited." 6 The Fourth Circuit's indecision is a clear example of the
uncertainty the courts face in interpreting the ADA.
IV.

THE CHEVRON DOCTRNE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE

The proper interpretation of the ADA depends on whether the judiciary
should be required to give credence to an administrative agency's interpretation of statute, a question that remains effectively unanswered. On the one
hand, "[t]o determine 'what the law is' in the context of an actual controversy
that turns on a question of statutory meaning is the quintessential judicial
function."'2 1 This view has its roots as far back as Marbury v. Madison,2

122
123

lu

Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Systems, Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349, n.2 (4th Cir. 1996).
123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997)(en banc).
See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 168 (quoting de la Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir.

1986) (quotation omitted)).
12
Id. at 169.
12
Id. at 168. However, this case involved a plaintiff suffering from asymptomatic HIV. In
Bragdon v.Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2204 (1998), the Supreme Court of the United States specifically
found that asymptomatic HIV is a disability under the ADA, overruling Runnebaum in that regard.
127

Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance ofPower in the Administrative

State, 89 COLUM. L REV. 452, 452 (1989) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 COLUM. L REv. 2071,

2085 (1990) ("Before the discretionary, policy-making administrative agency became pervasive, the notion
that courts would interpret the law, including federal statutes, seemed axiomatic."). See also John F.
Manning, ConstitutionalStructure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretation of Agency Rules, 96
COLUM. L REV. 612,617 (1996):
If an agency's roles mean whatever it says they mean... the agency effectively has the power
of self-interpretation. This empowerment 'contradicts a major premise of our constitutional
scheme and of contemporary separation of powers case law - that a fusion of lawmaking and
law-exposition is especially dangerous to our liberties.'
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which held that it was the courts' "proper and peculiar province"1 29 to
determine what the law is.
Conversely, administrative agencies might be better situated to interpret
statutes for several reasons. First, administrative agencies have technical
expertise and are familiar with the history, purpose and current congressional
views, 3 ° areas in which the judicial branch is severely lacking. Most
importantly, agencies, unlike courts, are accountable to their electorate.' 3 '
The controlling case today argues for great judicial deference to agency
interpretations. In Chevron v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc.,'32 the

Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") revised its previous interpretation
of a statutory term under the Clean Air Act. The Court held that so long as
Congress had not directly addressed the issue before the agency and had not
foreclosed the agency's interpretation, then the agency's construction of the
statute should be upheld unless it was unreasonable or otherwise impermissi133
ble.
A unanimous Court set forth a two-part test for deciding when to accept
an agency's interpretation of a statute. 34 The first step requires the court to
determine whether clear congressional intent governs the interpretation of the

statute.

35

If so, the court must give effect to such intent.

36

If Congress has

not "directly addressed the precise question at issue," the second step of the
Chevron test requires that the court defer to the agency's interpretation, so
37
long as that interpretation is permissible.
Id. (footnote omitted).
i2
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
129
Id. at 177 ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is.").
130
See Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DuKE
LJ.511, 514; Stephen G. Breyer, JudicialReview of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L REV. 363,
368 (1986).
131
See Sunstein, 90 COLUM. L REV. at 2087.
132
467 U.S. 837 (1984) (footnote omitted).

133

1.

Id. at 84345.
See also Russel L Weaver & Thomas A. Schweitzer, Deference to Agency Interpretationsof

Regulations: A Post-ChevronAssessment 22 MEM. ST. U. L REV. 411,429-430 (1992) (arguing there is
strong evidence for supporting the proposition that all standards, including Chevron's, are applied
inconsistently); Quintin Johnstone, An Evaluationof the Rules of Statutory Interpretation,3 KAN. L REV.
1. 5 (1954) (arguing the Court uses a plethora of rules, a virtual "bag of tricks from which [it] pull[s]
respectable-sounding rules to justify any possible result"); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use
of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme CourtTerm, 68 IOWA L REV. 195, 214 (1983) (citing Judge
Harold Leventhal's emphasis on the previous point inregard to the Court's use of legislative history, stating
that it is "akin to 'looking over a crowd and picking out your friends."').
135
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
136

Id.

137

Id.
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The first problem with this deceivingly simplistic deferential test is the
fundamental issue of stare decisis. To some extent, the values promoted by
stare decisis and by Chevron conflict.' The doctrine of stare decisis requires
that courts uphold earlier judicial constructions of statutes.'3 9 Stare decisis
promotes certainty and predictability; once a meaning is fixed by the court, it
remains fixed, absent a congressional overruling or compelling reasons for
change."4 By ensuring the law does not change in response to shifts in the
political winds, stare decisis fosters respect for the courts and for the legal
process.' 4 '
In contrast, Chevron calls for deference to interpretations made by
administrative agencies, unless Congress clearly intended that a particular
interpretation should govern. 42 Chevron is premised, in part, on a recognition
of the need for flexibility and political responsiveness in the interpretation of
statutes. 43 Congress created agencies to administer statutes, thereby allowing

statutes to change over time in response to new circumstances, shifts in public
sentiment, or shifts in political power.'"
Some commentators argue that the rationales for deference to agencies
exist regardless of whether the courts have addressed the statute in question.'4 5
They reason that the courts should apply the doctrine of judicial deference
even when courts have previously interpreted the statute." s Others disagree,
arguing that "Chevron represents a usurpation of judicial power and results in
[an] excessive concentration of power in administrative agencies."'4
139

See Rebecca Hamer-White, The Stare Decisis "Exception" to the Chevron Deference Rule, 44

FLA. L REV. 723, 754-55 (1992).
139
Stare decisis is defined as "the doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for courts to
follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
590 (Pocket ed. 1996).
140
Id.
141
142

Id.
See Jahan Sharifi, Precedents Construing Statutes Administered by Federal Agencies after the

Chevron Decision: What Gives? 60 U. CHl. L REV. 223, 224 (1993).
143
Id. at 224.
M"

Id.

See Susan K. Goplen, Judicial Deference to Administrative Agencies' Legal Interpretations
After Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 68 WASH. L REv. 207, 226 (1993).
146
Id. (arguing that the Supreme Court reached the wrong conclusion in Lechmere, Inc. v NLRB,
145

502 U.S. 527 (1992) where it held that when interpreting administrative statutes, instead of applying the
Chevron analysis, the Court will defer to its own previous interpretations rather than defer to administrative
agencies' interpretations of statutes).
147
Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogan, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers in the PostChevron Era, 32 B.C. L REV. 757, 759 (1991). To avoid an improper balance of power, our founding
fathers felt that an active judiciary was necessary to ensure legislative supremacy over the executive branch
on matters of policy. See id. They reasoned that when the judiciary defers to the executive branch, the
legislative branch is weakened. See id. This undermines our constitutional structure and defeats the
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An in-depth analysis of the impact of Chevron on administrative law is
beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, a brief foray into the Court's
reasoning may prove helpful. In an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, the
Court noted that if an agency is acting pursuant to an explicit delegation of
authority by Congress, courts should give agency interpretations "controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute."'t" s In support of this broad rule of deference, Justice Stevens offered
three rationales: (1) delegation by Congress to an agency implies discretion
to interpret;'4 9 (2) comparative competence:'S agencies are experts in their
areas of delegated power where courts
are not; and (3) agencies are politically
1
accountable while courts are not.
In its application, however, the simplicity of the two step Chevron test has
been deceiving, as exemplified by its second weakness: the inconsistency with
which the highest court of the land executes it. Since Chevron, the Supreme
Court has achieved results that have been greatly deferential, allowing
agencies to subvert congressional intent.5 2 Conversely, the Court has also
reached decisions that severely constrict agency discretion to make policy
choices.' 53 The Court will have to address this inconsistency when determining whether the courts should defer to the EEOC's interpretation of the ADA.
V. THE INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE CHEVRON DOCTINE
The inconsistency with which the Supreme Court applies the Chevron test
is exemplified in several later decisions. These decisions suggest that the
justices may be more comfortable applying the doctrine of stare decisis than
applying the Chevron doctrine. For example, in Maislin Industries, U.S. Inc.

purpose underlying our system of checks and balances. See id Consequently, there exists no constitutional
justification for court deference. See id. at 787. Thus, the implementation of the Chevron test has farreaching consequences, threatening the very foundation of our judicial system. See id.
14
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)

(footnote omitted).
149
Id. at 865.
Id.
Id. at 865-66.
152
See Young v. Community Nutrition Institute, 476 U.S. 974, 981 (1986) (finding the meaning
of section 346 of the FDCA was ambiguous and the FDA's interpretation should be given deference).
"53
See Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc. 497 U.S. 116, 113 (1990) (finding that
deference to an agency's statutory construction was inappropriate where congressional intent was
unambiguous and refusing to apply the Chevron analysis where the Court had a long history of insisting
150
151

on a literal interpretation of astatute). Additionally, the courts have excepted from Chevron deference the
interpretation of criminal law by the Justice Department. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152
(1990).
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v. Primary Steel, Inc.,'" decided in 1990, the Court concluded that the
Interstate Commerce Commission's new interpretation of shipping rates was
"flatly inconsistent with the statutory scheme as a whole."' 53 Furthermore, the
Court held that "[o]nce we have determined a statute's clear meaning, we
adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge
an agency's later interpretation of the statute against our prior determination
of the statute's meaning."' 56
In the two years following Maislin, four justices departed, significantly
changing the composition of the Court."5 Nonetheless, when Lechmere, Inc.
v. NLRB 58 was decided in 1992, the Supreme Court again refused to apply the
Chevron test because it had previously addressed the statute in question.'5 9
Once more, the doctrine of stare decisis took precedence over that of judicial
deference, eclipsing the Chevron test. In light of these decisions, when an
agency's present interpretation conflicts with either past agency or judicial
interpretations of the statute, one must consider what weight, if any, the prior
interpretation should be given."
A significantly less complex situation occurs where no prior judicial
interpretation exists and the court is confronted with only the agency's present
interpretation of the statute. In those cases, as is the case in this instance with
the EEOC guidelines, no conflict with stare decisis exists.' 6' Congress
enacted the ADA on July 26, 1990.62 Exactly one year later, the EEOC
issued its regulations interpreting the ADA, including the Interpretive
Guidance in the Appendix." Yet, the Act did not become effective until July
of 1992. Accordingly, until the effective date, no litigation had ensued
regarding the proper interpretation of the Act. Therefore, for purposes of this
Article, the doctrine of stare decisis is inapplicable, in either the context of
prior judicial interpretation or prior agency interpretation. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court would still be expected to apply the two-part test set forth in
Chevron when deciding whether to accept the EEOC's interpretation of the

1SS

497 U.S. 116 (1990).
Maislin, 497 U.S. at 131.

Id.
See Goplen, supra note 145, at 223 (1993).
502 U.S. 527 (1992).
138
159
Id. at 536 (1992) (refusing to adhere to the NLRB's interpretation of the NLRA because the
Court had previously interpreted the Act).
160
See Rebecca Hanner-White, The Stare Decisis "Exception" to the Chevron Deference Rule, 44
FLA. L REV. 723, 741 (1992).
Id.
161
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
162
156
1

16

29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1996).
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ADA. For purposes of this Article, it is assumed that the Court will apply the
test as it was set forth in Chevron.
VI.

APPLICATION OF THE CHEVRON DOCRIUNE TO THE EEOC's
INTERPRETATIVE GUIDANCE

In Chevron, a unanimous Court set forth a two-part test for deciding when
to accept an agency's interpretation of a statute. The first step requires the
court to determine whether clear congressional intent governs the interpretation of the statute.' 64 If so, the court must give effect to such intent because
the statute is unambiguous. 65 If Congress has not "directly addressed the
precise question at issue," then the statute is ambiguous and the second step
of the Chevron test requires that the court defer to the agency's interpretation,
so long as that interpretation is permissible." 6 A permissible interpretation of
the statute is one that is not "arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the
7
'6

statute."'

The "starting point for interpretation of a statute 'is the language of the
statute itself."",161 Chevron's first step requires courts to avoid attempting to
extricate legislative intent themselves' 69 and to "assume that the legislative
purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used."'' 7 0 Thus, if

467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); but see Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARv. L. REV.
863, 870 (1930) ("The chances that of several hundred [legislators], each will have exactly the same
determinate situations in mind as possible reductions of a given determinable, are infinitesimally small.").
16
Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
166
Id. "[When] Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does
not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute." Id. (footnotes omitted).
167
Id. at 844. See also Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989)
(holding that agency interpretations of statutes are entitled to deference unless the agency interpretation
contradicts the plain language of the statute).
16
See Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjomo, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990) (quoting Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
169
See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Unes, 130 F.3d 893, 897 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Smith v.
United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993) ("[wlhen a word is not defined by statute, we normally construe
it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning."). But see Merz v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.,
969 F.2d 201,205-07 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that a court should reject the literal meaning of a statute in
favor of one which favors congressional intent); Sciarotta v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 135, 138-39 (3rd Cir. 1988)
(same); Swain v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 543, 546-47 (11 th Cir. 1982) (same).
170
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,431-32 (1987) (quoting Richards v. United States, 369
U.S. 1, 9 (1962)). See also Karin P. Sheldon, "It's Not My Job to Care": UnderstandingJustice Scalia's
Method of Statutory InterpretationThrough Sweet Home and Chevron, 24 B.C. ENVTL_ AFF. L REV. 487,
503 (1997) (where statutory language is unambiguous, any use of legislative history to determine its
164
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the language of a statute "is plain and admits of no more than one meaning"
and "if the law is within the constitutional authority of the law-making body
which passed it," then "the duty of interpretation does not arise" and "the71 sole
'
function of the courts is to enforce the statute according to its terms."'
The plain meaning of the words "substantially limits" is that the individual's impairment, currently and in actuality, not potentially or hypothetically,
substantially limits a major life activity.17 1 If Congress had intended to adopt
a hypothetical approach, it could have adopted language to that effect.1'7 But
the courts' treatment of an impairment as a disability, where such an
impairment is controlled by medication or ameliorative devices, has two
congressionally unintended effects on the "substantially limits" language.
First, such an interpretation eliminates the need for a "substantial
limit[ation]." An interpretation that considers an impairment to be a disability
because of its hypothetical or potential 74 limitations when mitigating

meaning, "poison[s] the well of future legislation, depriving legislators of the assurance that ordinary terms,
used in an ordinary context, will be given a predictable meaning.").
171
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). See also, e.g., Runnebaum v.
Nationsbank of Maryland, N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 168 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc):
Here, the term "impairment" is not defined in the statute. Webster's defines "impair" as to
"make worse by or as if by diminishing in some material respect." Webster's Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary 603 (1986); see also BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 677 (5th ed. 1981)
("To weaken, or make worse, to lessen in power, diminish, or relax, or otherwise affect in an
injurious manner."). "Impairment" is defined as a "decrease in strength, value, amount, or
quality." Webster's I New Riverside University Dictionary 612 (1988).
Id. at 168. The Runnebaum court reasoned that the statutory meaning of "impairment" was plain and
unambiguous, and as a result had no reason to resort to the legislative history to ascertain Congress' intent.
Id.
172
See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893,902 (10th Cir. 1997) ("In making disability
determinations, we are concerned with whether the impairment affects the individual in fact, not whether
it would hypothetically affect the individual without the use of corrective measures.")
17
In Sicardv. City of Sioux City, 950 F. Supp. 1420,1436 (N.D. Iowa 1996), the court found that
the plain meaning of impairment was only the untreated condition. ("[Tihe statute certainly does not say
'impairment plus treatment' or 'impairment after treatment' or 'treated impairment."'). Id. However, the
opposite argument can be just as easily constructed: the statute does not say "impairment prior to
treatment" or "impairment without medication." At the very least, this court would have to concede that
the statute is ambiguous.
174
The Supreme Court of the United States held in Bragdon v. Abbot, 118 S.Ct. 2196 (1998) that
reproduction is a major life activity. Id at 2205. The Court further held that asymptomatic HIV infection
is a disability under the ADA, because the minute risk of transmitting the disease during the act of
reproduction could amount to a substantial limitation on that major life activity. Id. at 2206-07. With this
ruling, however, the Court has broadened the scope of the ADA to include any individuals who have a
genetic defect which predicts the later onset of a debilitating or fatal disease that can be passed on to their
children. See id at 2216 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring) (finding that the plaintiffs argument "[t]aken to its
logical extreme, would render every individual with a genetic marker for some debilitating disease
"disabled" here and now because of some possible future effects."). Congress could not possibly have
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measures aren't considered, renders the "substantially limits" language
unnecessary. Such a reading violates the basic rule of statutory construction
that a statute should not be read in such a way that it "[rienders one part a
'
mere redundancy."' 7
Second,
[A]lithough the statute does not expressly state what time frame
is to be used, the tense of the phrase 'substantially limits' clearly
indicates the determination is to be made with regard to present
reality. The definition is written in the present tense and contemplates that the impairment
at the present time substantially limits a
176
activity.
life
major
Because it is presumed that Congress acts in accordance with the rules of
statutory construction,'" this interpretation of its intent is the more plausible.
Therefore, because clear congressional intent is expressed through the
"ordinary meaning of the words used", the text is unambiguous and the court's
78
inquiry should end here.
Assuming, for argument's sake, that the text was ambiguous, the court
could then consider the ADA's legislative history to determine congressional
intent. The courts who support the EEOC guidelines heavily rely upon the
legislative history. Specifically, courts rely on the House and Education and
Labor Committee Report, which explained that "[w]hether a person has a
disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating
measures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids."' 79 Similarly,
the House Judiciary Committee Report stated: "The impairment should be
assessed without considering whether mitigating measures, such as auxiliary
aids or reasonable accommodations, would result in less-than-substantial
limitation."'' "
Nevertheless, the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee Report
is inconsistent with the two House Reports. In particular, the Senate Report

intended such individuals to be beneficiaries of the ADA. (In Bragdon, the Court noted the dispute over
whether mitigating measures should be considered, but did not further explore the issue.) Id. at 2206.
175
See Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1961) (' he statute admits a reasonable
construction which gives effect to all of its provisions. In these circumstances we will not a adopt a strained
reading which renders one part a mere redundancy.").
'76
See Harris v. H&W Contracting, Co., 102 F.3d 516, 603 (11 th Cir. 1996).
07
See McNaxy v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479,496 (1991).
17
See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,431-32 (1987) (quoting Richards v. United States,
369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962))."
79
H.R. REP. No. 101485(11), at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334.
'1'
H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11). at 28 (1990). reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,451.
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indicates that one of the goals of the third prong "[i]s to ensure that persons
with medical conditions that are under control, and that therefore do not
currently limit major life activities,are not discriminated against on the basis
of their medical conditions."'' Although at least one circuit court has
addressed the discrepancy between the reports, subsequently finding that the
House Reports were due greater weight,' the Senate Committee's point
remains persuasive.
Moreover, the wording of the ADA defines disability in the disjunctive,
not the conjunctive: it lists three possible ways of defining a "disability",
separated by an "or" not an "and." A "disability" is defined as (a) a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; (b) a record of such impairment; or (c) being
regarded as having such an impairment.18 The use of "or" denotes an
alternative,1 4 that a choice or selection is to be made. Therefore, its use by
Congress is clearly intended to mean that those who don't qualify for coverage
under one definition can seek, as an alternative, coverage under another.
Allowing an individual to proceed under two categories at once would render
the other categories superfluous.
For example, assume an individual is "substantially limited in a major life
activity" without the use of mitigating measures, i.e. an insulin-dependent
diabetic. That individual would clearly be found "disabled" under the first
definition of a disability: a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one of his major life activities. The problem, however, is that the
EEOC's interpretation allows that same individual to proceed under the third
definition of disability as well: being regarded as having such an impairment.
Under this reasoning, the individual would have two gateways to ADA
coverage where he should only have had one.
If Congress had intended that the individual be able to proceed under more
than one definition at a time, Congress would have worded the statute
differently, separating the categories by an "and/or," or by using wording such
as: "a disability is one or more of the following." But Congress specifically
chose to create three distinct definitions of a disability. By allowing plaintiffs
whose impairments are controlled to proceed under the first prong definition,
the EEOC's interpretation creates a class of plaintiffs who are not substantially limited in a major life activity and are not regardedas being such.

191

S.REP. No. 101-116, at 24 (1989) (emphasis added).

182

See Washington v. HCA Health Serv. of Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 467-69 (5th Cir. 1998).

42 U.S.C § 12102(2)(1990) (emphasis added).
"Or" is used to indicate "an alternative, usually only before the last in a series." See RIVERSIDE
WEBSTER'S I1DICTIONARY 482 (Rev. ed. 1996).
193

u
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Nevertheless, if the individual's diabetic condition were evaluated with
mitigating measures in place, then the ADA would cover only those individuals Congress intended to protect. This interpretation draws clear distinctions
between the different types of "disability" from which a plaintiff can claim he
suffers. Consideration of the same individual with mitigating measures in
place would reveal that the same individual could proceed only under the third
prong: being regarded as having an impairment that substantially limits a
major life activity.'
The individual has not been left without recourse, but
rather has been categorized as being discriminated against, not because he is,
in actuality, substantially limited, but rather because he is simply perceived as
such. Review of the Senate Report indicates that the goal of the third prong
was to create a cause of actionfor those who were not substantiallylimited
because their conditions were under control, but instead, because the
individual was still perceived as being in some way limited. 6
The legislative history provides another reason for rejecting the EEOC
Interpretive Guidance: there is authority that indicates that the definition of a
disability was a functional one, not one based on hypothetical situations. In
fact, it is clear that Congress did not support a definition of disability based
on medical diagnoses of future conditions, but rather preferred one based in
fact." 7 Thus, the Act specifically requires that an individual's impairment
substantially limit a major life activity. By recasting the definition from a
functional one to a hypothetical one, the EEOC requires contemplation of a
hypothetical world, and disregards the reality of the individual's situation."'
Assuming, for argument's sake, that the plain language of the ADA is
ambiguous and that the legislative history is inconclusive, then congressional
intent can be deemed elusive. Thus, the second step of the Chevron test
requires that the court defer to the agency's interpretation, so long as that

195
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (C) (1990). For purposes of this Article, the second prong is irrelevant.
If the individual had a record of a disability, then he would simply proceed under the second prong. See
42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2) (B) (1990).
19
See S. REP. No. 101-116. But see Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 860 (1st
Cir. 1998) (asserting that "these passages can be easily squared by recognizing that an individual could
have a "disability" under both prong one (having an impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity) and prong three ("regarded as" having such an impairment) at the same time; one does not
preclude the other."). However, this argument fails to address the plain text of the passages, which as
discussed, is worded in the disjunctive.
19
See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. H9072 (daily ed. May 1, 1990) (statement of Rep. Bartlett) ("The
ADA does not cover 900 classes of disability. The ADA includes a functional rather than a medical
definition of disability. An individual with a disability is one who -has, has a record of, or is regarded as
having-a physical or metal impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.") (emphasis added).
In
See also Harris v. H&W Contracting, Co., 102 F.3d 516, 581-82 (11th Cir. 1996).
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interpretation is permissible.' 9 However, the basic rules of statutory
construction render the EEOC's interpretation impermissible for a variety of
reasons.
First, as discussed earlier, the plain language of the statute contradicts the
EEOC guidelines. Second, under the guidelines, the EEOC has significantly
increased the class of plaintiffs who can seek redress under the ADA by
allowing plaintiffs to proceed under the first prong definition of "disability"
even though they are not, in actuality, substantially limited in a major life
activity." These plaintiffs would otherwise have brought their cause of
action under the third prong definition of disability. In other words, the
plaintiff would have to show that their employer regarded the impairment as
substantially limiting."9' By allowing the courts to contemplate situations that
do not exist, the EEOC has rendered the third prong moot,"9 by reading the
"substantially limits" wording right out of the statute. 93 Under the EEOC
guidelines, these individuals no longer have to prove that their employers
regarded their impairment as substantially limiting, even where the employer
may not even have known such impairment existed, 94 because they can now
proceed under the first prong, even without a substantial limitation.
A simple example would be someone who wears contact lenses to correct
their vision to 20/20. An employer who intends to discharge such an employee
for poor performance can be discouraged as a result of the EEOC guidelines.
9
190

See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
See also Harris, 102 F.3d at 586 (noting that the ADA is the only anti-discrimination statute

which has an ambiguous protected class; the other classes all have immutable characteristics). See also id.
at 594-95 (arguing that "[tihe anti discrimination principle presupposes an animus-based form of disability
discrimination" which is lacking in individuals with controlled impairments precisely because their
impairments are controlled.).
19"
Plaintiffs who have a cause of action under the second prong definition are not affected by this
analysis. The EEOC in its regulations defines the third prong definition. 'is regarded as having such an
impairment' as: "(1) [h]aving a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life
activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such a limitation; (2) [h]aving a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others
toward such impairment; or (3) [hlaving none of the impairments defined in paragraphs (h)(1) or (2) of this
section but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment." See 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(l) (1997) (emphasis added). Section (h) defines 'physical or mental impairment.' See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(1) (1997).
192
It is highly unlikely that an employer will arbitrarily begin treating an employee as having a

disability where none exists. Clearly, then, this prong was intended to protect those individuals who have
taken mitigating measures to correct impairments that would otherwise be substantially limiting, e.g. a
visually-impaired person who, wearing corrective lenses, has 20/20 vision, but who is dismissed because
his employer perceives him as being visually-impaired.
193
See Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
"9

See Arthur F. Silbergeld & Stacie S. Polashuk, Chronic Serious Health Impainnents and Worker

Absences Under Federal Employment Laws, 14 LABOR LAWYER 1, 20-21 (Summer 1998).
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When that individual hears of his impending discharge and claims discrimination under the ADA because of his disability, as interpreted by the EEOC, the
employer must now keep the individual on, if only long enough to document
why the person is being terminated. Clearly, this creates an unfair burden for
an employer trying to exercise his at will employment privileges and whose
reason for terminating the employee had nothing to do with a real or perceived
disability.'95
Third, even assuming the EEOC guidelines were permissible and not
violative of either the ADA's plain text or the basic canons of statutory
construction, the guidelines, as Interpretive Guidance, are not entitled to any
special deference under Chevron."96 It is merely an interpretative rule, not a
substantive or legislative one. 97 Whereas legislative rules have the force of
law, 98 interpretative guidelines are only persuasive." Specifically, the EEOC
guidelines in question are not included within the EEOC's regulations, which
are binding, and are instead in an appendix to those regulations entitled
"ADA Title I Interpretive Guidance."' Thus, as the title plainly states, it is

See also Harris v. H&W Contracting, Co., 102 F.3d 516, 582-85 (11th Cir. 1996) (arguing the
plaintiff's evidentiary burden in ADA cases is significantly lightened under the EEOC interpretation and
that this expansion of the term "disability" effectively entitles plaintiffs to "just cause" protection from
termination); Silbergeld & Polashuk, supra note 194 (arguing that the EEOC's guidelines invite abuse by
individuals with completely controlled conditions). Cf. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2216 (1998)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (asserting that voluntary choice can not constitute a "limit" on one's life
activities).
1%
But see Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (finding that guidelines,
"[w]hile not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance... ").
197
See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,301-04 (1979) (explaining the distinction between
interpretive roles and substantive or legislative rules). See also Headrick v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 24 F.3d
1272, 1282 (10th Cir. 1994) (granting no special deference to Department of Labor comment because it
is a "purely interpretative rule").
In
See Joseph v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1154 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
For a discussion of interpretive roles and legislative rules, see generally 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS &
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE chs. 6-17 (3d ed. 1994).
199
See Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 124, 140 (1944). See also Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial
Hosp., 514 U.S. 87 (1995) (holding that because interpretive rules are not subject to the notice and
comment procedure, they are not accorded the weight that regulations are given); Batterton v. Francis, 432
U.S. 416, 425 (1977) ("[A] court is not required to give effect to an interpretive regulation. Varying
degrees of deference are accorded to administrative interpretations.. ."); Washington v. HCA Health Serv.
of Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 469-70 (5th Cir. 1998) ("(B]ecause the EEOC's Interpretive Guidelines are
not only not promulgated pursuant to any delegated authority to define statutory terms or the like but are
also not subject to the notice and comment procedure like regulations are, they are not entitled to the high
degree of deference that is accorded to regulations under the Chevron doctrine.") (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
2oo
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1996).
195
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clearly interpretive."' As a result, while the EEOC guidelines may be entitled
to some consideration in the courts' analyses, these guidelines do not have the
force of law and courts are not required to, and for the reasons stated herein,
should not defer to them.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Although the Tenth Circuit's analysis for its opposition to the adoption of
the EEOC guidelines presents powerful arguments, the Supreme Court will
not likely be convinced. Assuming it applies the Chevron test, the Court will
likely find that Congress' intent is clear: to protect those individuals with
physical impairments that substantially limit a major life activity without
regard to mitigating measures. Additionally, the Court will likely defer to the
EEOC's interpretation for at least two reasons: (1) because the interpretation
set forth by the ADA is a reasonable one, given the purpose and legislative
history of the ADA under the second step of the Chevron test; and 2) it is
likely to agree with the majority of the courts that Congress intended to
protect all disabled individuals, regardless of mitigating measures.
Moreover, in Bragdon v. Abbot, 2" a heavily fragmented Court recently
interpreted the ADA as extending to those individuals with asymptomatic HIV
infections. " The conclusion that the ADA is intended to protect those who
may in the future have a debilitating condition due to asymptomatic HIV
infection may signal the Court's inclination to encompass within the scope of
the ADA all those individuals who in the future may have an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity.' This is a far-reaching expansion
of the class of plaintiffs who can seek redress under the ADA, and likely is a
broader scope than Congress originally had intended.
Presently, the United States Courts of Appeal remain divided on the issue.
The circuit courts in favor of adopting the EEOC guidelines are: the First,
Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh; the Fourth Circuit
is undecided; the Tenth Circuit is against adopting the EEOC guidelines; and,

201
See, e.g., Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760,763 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that EEOC's
no mitigating measure guideline constitutes an interpretive, not legislative, rule, so the reviewing court must
conduct an independent evaluation of the guideline).
22
118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
203

Id. at 2204-05.

2W

See id. at 2214, 2216 (Rehnquist, CJ. concurring).
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the District of Columbia and Second' 5 Circuits have not yet precisely
addressed the issue.
To some degree, the federal courts of appeal seem to agree that the EEOC
guidelines on mitigating measures in the appendix to the regulations do not
constitute binding law, but are entitled to some deference to the extent they do
not conflict with the statute itself.' Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that
those in favor of adopting the EEOC guidelines failed to address what may
very well be the strongest argument made by those opposing the adoption of
the guidelines.
The opposition argues that the EEOC's interpretation of the ADA
conflicts with the wording of the statute. Specifically, the conclusion the
opposition finds problematic is that an individual with the benefit of
medication who is not substantially limited in any major life activityis still
considered disabled. 7 In effect, the opposition argues, considering an
impairment in this fashion would negate the ADA's statutory requirement that
an individual be substantially limited in a major life activity. 8 It is highly
questionable as to whether this was Congress' intent when it included this
requirement in the statute. Yet none of the decisions reviewed addressed this
argument with any merit, and conveniently ignored the barrier raised by the
Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee Report.' Therefore, until the
Supreme Court addresses the issue, it seems each court will continue to
interpret the troublesome act on its own. No doubt Congress will be ill at ease
with a judicial interpretation that entirely eliminates the explicit language
which requires a substantial limitation in a major life activity in order for an
individual to be covered under the ADA. And rightly so.

W5

In Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998), the

court noted that a learning disabled plaintiff's "[h]istory of self-accommodations, while allowing her to
achieve roughly average reading skills (on some measures) when compared to the general population, 'do
not take [her] outside of the protective provisions of the ADA.") (citation omitted). This circuit has not
yet precisely addressed the issue of whether mitigating measures should be considered, although given this
wording, it appears they are inclined to disregard them, implicitly adopting the majority position.
W
See, e.g., Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 766 (6th Cir. 1997) (6th Cir. Sept. 2,
1997)(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
20
Id.
Id.
S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24 (1989) (emphasis added). See also discussion infra pp. 22-24 and
accompanying notes 183-88.
2
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